NATO is analysing the extension of its pipeline system to the eastern flank, and Romania is increasingly viewed not only as a border state but as a potential logistics hub for the entire Black Sea region, according to Dumitru Chisalita, Chairman of the Smart Energy Association (AEI).

He writes that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has reshaped Europe’s security architecture and forced NATO to rethink its logistical priorities. For decades, the Alliance focused on interoperability, military technology and rapid troop mobility. Now, planners are “rediscovering an old lesson”:
“Without fuel, even the most powerful tanks, planes or ships are not worth much. Logistics has once again become the backbone of military power.”

The war in Ukraine demonstrated that transporting fuel by road or rail tankers is vulnerable, costly and difficult to sustain in high-intensity conflict. As a result, pipelines for refined products – kerosene, diesel, gasoline – are regaining strategic importance.

Chisalita notes that few Europeans know about the NATO Pipeline System (NPS), one of the Alliance’s key logistical infrastructures. It transports refined fuels needed for air bases, land units and operations. Its main component, the Central Europe Pipeline System (CEPS), crosses Western Europe and links refineries, ports, warehouses and air bases. CEPS totals 5,300 km of pipelines and serves dozens of facilities. Overall, the NPS exceeds 10,000 km of pipelines and four million cubic metres of storage.

“It is not just a transport system. It is an infrastructure designed to allow rapid deployment and long-term support of military operations,” the expert writes.

Before 2022, NATO’s logistical centre of gravity was in Western Europe. Now, the eastern flank – from the Baltic to the Black Sea – hosts the largest concentration of Allied troops in decades. New battle groups have been created in Poland, Romania and the Baltic states, and the Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base is being expanded into one of NATO’s most important facilities in Eastern Europe.

“All these bases need a seemingly trivial thing: continuous and safe fuel supply,” he goes on to remark. In peacetime, road, rail and sea transport suffice; in major conflict, their vulnerability becomes obvious. Hence the need to extend the pipeline network eastward.

Romania, he argues, inherits infrastructure “built for another war.” During the Cold War, the country developed a strategic system of pipelines and fuel depots designed to supply both the economy and the army. It included crude-oil and product pipelines, dispersed depots, links to Ploie?ti refineries, oil ports and air bases. Some facilities were semi-buried or underground, though Romania did not build large underground cavities comparable to other NATO states. Still, tanks protected by earth waves and camouflaged depots existed.

Part of this infrastructure still exists: some pipelines are operated by CONPET, some military storage sites remain active, while other sections were decommissioned or privatised after 1990.

“That is the fundamental difference between Romania and many other states in the region: Romania does not start from scratch,” Dumitru Chisalita points out.

From NATO’s perspective, Romania’s most important infrastructure is the Constanta–refinery area corridor, as Oil Terminal, Petrobrazi, Petrotel and Petromidia form one of South-Eastern Europe’s key energy hubs. Pipelines connecting these facilities could become the basis of a future logistics corridor supplying NATO bases in Romania and later Bulgaria and Turkey.

Estimates suggest that 250 to 500 km of existing infrastructure could gain strategic value after technical assessments and modernisation. Integration with NATO logistics would require new pipelines to Bulgaria, direct links to Mihail Kogalniceanu, new pumping stations, modern loading terminals, high-capacity warehouses in Dobrogea, and advanced automation and monitoring. Depending on the scenario, 300–400 km of new pipelines may be needed. Costs would be significant, but NATO and EU programmes for military mobility and critical infrastructure could finance much of the effort.

Chisalita argues that economic benefits could be substantial: contracts for Romanian industry, construction and assembly works, equipment production, automation, security systems, maintenance and new jobs. If the state retained ownership and opted for concession-based operation, recurring revenues of EUR 20 – 30 million per year could be possible.

The Port of Constanta, already a major logistics route for Ukrainian exports, could become the energy gateway of the eastern flank, gaining a new dimension within a NATO fuel-transport network.

The expert notes that strategic infrastructure also brings costs: protection against sabotage, cyber-attacks and hybrid threats, plus administrative challenges and political debates. Still, these are typical for major projects.

The AEI expert points out that Romania benefits from a rare combination of assets: a strategic Black Sea port, major refineries, a national pipeline network, an experienced energy industry and one of NATO’s largest bases. “If these elements are transformed into a coherent system, Romania will no longer be just a beneficiary of NATO security, but a provider of the logistics infrastructure without which the defence of the eastern flank cannot function effectively,” Dumitru Chisalita concludes.