n the eve of the NATO summit in Ankara, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee (CMC), Giuseppe Cavo Dragone, the Alliance’s highest military body, told the Athens-Macedonian News Agency in an interview with Maria Aroni that NATO is facing key military challenges at a time of unprecedented shifts in the global security environment.

He underlined Greece’s role in collective defence, noting that it is among the first member states already meeting NATO’s new target of defence spending at 5% of GDP.

Cavo Dragone also said Greece is evolving into one of the Alliance’s “ strategic hubs” for logistics support, amid efforts to strengthen NATO’s operational readiness and sustain its military posture across member states.

Τhe full interview follows:

Q1. The Ankara Summit comes at a time of major geopolitical and military challenges for the Alliance. Given the ongoing war in Ukraine, tensions in the Middle East and growing global uncertainty, what do you see as the Summit’s principal military priorities? From your perspective as Chair of the NATO Military Committee, what outcomes would you consider essential for strengthening NATO’s deterrence and defence?
A: This Summit takes place at a challenging time, no doubt. The war in Ukraine continues, the Middle East remains unstable, including the recent conflict involving Iran, and the overall security situation is less predictable than before. For NATO, but also for the 32 Chiefs of Defence I represent, three military priorities are clear.
First, we must confirm how the Hague commitment on 5% is turning pledges into real capabilities: not documents, not statements, but ammunition stocks, air defence, logistics. The essential elements that allow us to fight and to sustain a fight over time. Second, interoperability, and this means a defence industry that delivers, at scale and speed, all those standardized military instrument we need for credible deterrence. If thirty-two nations invest more money but their equipment and forces cannot operate together, this effort does not translate into real strength. Third, Ukraine. Our military support must continue without interruption, because a strong Ukraine contributes directly to the security of the whole Alliance.
Success at the Ankara Summit means Allies leave with concrete results, beyond political statements. Deterrence is built with steel, people, and readiness.

Q2. Greece has long been one of NATO’s top defence spenders and is among the first Allies to meet the Alliance’s new spending target. From a military perspective, what does this mean for NATO? How do Greece’s capabilities and future defence investments contribute to NATO’s collective defence, especially on its southeastern flank?
A: Greece has invested seriously in defence for many years. Its geography does not allow for a different approach. Indeed, Greece is among the first Allies to meet NATO’s new defence spending target. This is not merely a praise, but a recognition of Greece’s long-standing and consistent investment in its defence.
From a military point of view, these investments give the Alliance real capabilities in an important region: air power, naval presence in the Eastern Mediterranean, and forces that are genuinely operational, not only well-funded on paper. Greece’s geographical position, at the crossroads of regions marked by instability – the Eastern Mediterranean, the Middle East and North Africa – gives it particular strategic importance for the Alliance. A strong and operationally capable Ally in this region strengthens NATO’s overall deterrence and defence.

As Greece’s defence investment continues to grow, we would like to see further progress in integrated air and missile defence, naval modernisation, and closer interoperability with neighbouring Allies. This is how national investment becomes collective deterrence.

Q3. Beyond defence investments, Greece is also becoming increasingly important to NATO’s military mobility and logistics. What role do you see for Greece in the Alliance’s wider logistics network? 
A: This subject does not receive enough attention, but it is absolutely relevant. Modern deterrence depends not only on aircraft, ships and brigades, but on the ability to move fuel, ammunition, and troops quickly when required. Greece has significant advantages here: ports, road and rail connections, and direct access from the Mediterranean toward the Balkans and the Black Sea region.
I believe Greece is already evolving into one of the Alliance’s strategic logistics hubs, and this development should continue.
A more diversified and resilient logistics network is now essential, not simply useful, for our ability to reinforce and sustain our forces.

Q4. The United States appears to be recalibrating its strategic priorities while remaining fully committed to NATO and European security. From a military perspective, how does this evolving U.S. posture influence NATO’s planning and priorities? Does it require the Alliance to adapt its force posture, operational planning, or regional focus?
A: I would dismiss the idea that the United States is stepping away. What we see is a United States that remains fully committed to Article 5 and to this Alliance, while also managing responsibilities that are genuinely global in scope. This is a natural reality for any major power, rather than something new.
At the same time, we should be clear-eyed: recent adjustments to US force posture are real. There have been changes such as the redeployment of an armoured brigade from Europe and reviews of troop presence. Nonetheless, as our Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has said clearly: these adjustments do not affect the executability of our regional plans. And our defence plans remain valid and credible.
What this means for our planning is straightforward: European Allies and Canada must assume a larger, fairer share of collective deterrence, and this is exactly the purpose of the Hague pledge: building genuine capability, rather than depending indefinitely on American enablers. And this does not reduce NATO’s level of ambition. It is a more balanced distribution of responsibility, which ultimately strengthens the Alliance’s resilience. Our work now focuses on closing specific gaps, like strategic enablers, air defence, and logistics, where Europe has traditionally relied on the United States. This is a healthy and necessary development. An Alliance in which every member contributes real capability is a stronger Alliance.

Q5. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated how rapidly the character of warfare is changing. From drones and autonomous systems to artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities and space, new technologies are reshaping the battlefield. Is NATO organized to adapt at the pace of these technological changes, or will the Alliance need new structures, faster decision-making processes, and perhaps an evolution of its strategic thinking?
A: Ukraine has taught us a great deal, through truly hard times. We have seen the character of war change rapidly: low-cost drones defeating expensive systems, AI-assisted targeting, cyber and space becoming contested domains from the first day of conflict, not to mention the turmoil in the cognitive and informative dimensions.
So, the question of whether NATO can keep pace is not theoretical. It is urgent. And I will be very frank: our traditional structures were designed for a slower environment – or let’s say, peace context – one characterised by long procurement cycles and careful consultations. These habits still have value, but they must not put us at risk! We need faster decision-making, quicker delivery of new technology to commanders, and doctrine that evolves at speed of the battlefield.
This connects to a concept I often use: NATO must become ‘antifragile’: not only resilient, but able to grow stronger through disruption, rather than simply survive it. We are making real progress on innovation, data-sharing, drone and counter-drone capabilities. But I will not claim we are moving as fast as the threat requires, at the moment. This is the honest answer, and it is exactly why Ankara really matters.